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The threat of avian influenza (AI) viruses to humans 
in Europe in 2005 prompted the Robert Koch Institute 
to establish a routine monitoring instrument con-
densing information on all human AI cases worldwide 
reported from the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and other sources into a line list for further analysis. 
The 235 confirmed AI cases captured from September 
2006 to August 2010 had a case fatality rate of 56% 
(132/235), ranging from 28% (27/98) in Egypt to 87% 
(71/82) in Indonesia. In a multivariable analysis, odds 
of dying increased by 33% with each day that passed 
from symptom onset until hospitalisation (OR: 1.33, 
p=0.002). In relation to children of 0–9 years, odds 
of fatal outcome were more than six times higher in 
10–19 year-olds and 20–29 year-olds (OR: 6.06, 95% 
CI: 1.89–19.48, p=0.002 and OR: 6.16, 95% CI: 2.05–
18.53, p=0.001, respectively), and nearly five times 
higher in patients of 30 years and older (OR: 4.71, 95% 
CI: 1.56–14.27, p=0.006) irrespective of the country, 
which had notified WHO of the cases. The situation in 
Egypt was special in that case number and incidence in 
children were more than twice as high as in any other 
age group or country. With this study, we show that 
data from the public domain yield important epide-
miological information on the global AI situation. This 
approach to establish a line list is time-consuming 
but a line list is a prerequisite to such evaluations. We 
thus would like to encourage the placing of a publicly 
accessible line list of anonymised human AI cases, 
e.g. directly by WHO. This might enhance our under-
standing of AI in humans and permit the rapid detec-
tion of changes in its epidemiology with implications 
for human health.
Introduction
Avian influenza (AI) has received public attention since 
1997 when human infections and thereof six fatal cases 
due to the highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) 
virus strain were confirmed in Hong Kong [1,2] and the 
pandemic potential of AI viruses was recognised [3]. 
Since 2003, when avian influenza A(H5N1) reappeared, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) has reported 
526 human infections with avian influenza A(H5N1), of 
which 311 were fatal, from Central Asian, European and 
African countries [4]. In several areas, highly patho-
genic AI in poultry has become endemic - with impli-
cations on human health, as exposure to sick or dead 
poultry is a risk factor for AI in humans [2,5-8]. Because 
of the pandemic potential of avian influenza A(H5N1), 
there is a great need for joint risk assessments and as 
a prerequisite for rapid international sharing of biologi-
cal materials, reference reagents, epidemiologic data 
and other information when available, e.g. between 
WHO member states and WHO [9].
Unique efforts were made to share information on AI 
infections in humans, domestic poultry and wild birds 
[10,11], e.g. through the reporting of confirmed human 
cases under the International Health Regulations (2005), 
supported by the WHO Global Alert and Response 
System (GAR) [12]. Case-based reports irrespective of 
the confirmation status have been mainly circulated by 
the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases of the 
International Society for Infectious Diseases (ProMED) 
[13]. News agencies such as Reuters Alertnet [14], and 
public health authorities, including the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) [15], the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)/Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) network on animal influ-
enza (OFFLU) [16], and the Global Initiative on Sharing 
Avian Influenza Data (GISAID) [17], have contributed in 
compiling and publishing updates on AI in humans and 
birds online. However, a uniform, case-based and thus 
statistically analysable epidemiological database of all 
human AI cases is not yet publicly available.
Germany, in need for timely information on the AI situ-
ation when Europe faced first avian influenza A(H5N1) 
cases in birds in 2005, established an AI monitoring 
system at the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) in October 
2005, which captures case-based information on AI 
infections in humans, as well as animal cases with 
zoonotic potential, worldwide. This system proved par-
ticularly useful for situation updates, risk assessments 
2 www.eurosurveillance.org
and national risk communication from February 2006 
onwards, when avian influenza A(H5N1) was detected 
in wild birds in Germany [18]. Although the body of lit-
erature has continuously increased meanwhile, namely 
through WHO situation updates [2,19-23], and virologi-
cal or epidemiological studies [5,24-27], the RKI AI mon-
itoring system has been maintained to have a flexible 
database available for epidemiological evaluations.
With the aim to examine whether a systematic line list 
based on publicly available information on human AI 
cases would contribute to the understanding of the epi-
demiology of human AI, we assessed case characteris-
tics, case fatality, and potential risk factors based on 
our established line list.
Methods
Monitoring system
The system established in October 2005, consists of a 
database, collecting events and reports in chronologi-
cal order, and a line list of human cases. The present 
analysis is based exclusively on the line list and cov-
ers information on human AI cases reported between 
September 2006 and August 2010 and with a symptom 
onset date not earlier than September 2006. The mon-
itoring followed a standardised operating procedure, 
defining information sources, intervals for screen-
ing the data and for the database management (as 
described below), and was maintained in Excel (ver-
sion 11, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington, 
USA).
Information sources
All screened information sources for human AI cases 
were publicly accessible. They included WHO [12], 
ECDC [15], ProMED [13], as well as Reuters Alertnet [14].
This range of sources was accessed to anticipate the 
extent of non-confirmed human AI and to assess the 
loss of information when ignoring them. All sources 
were screened on a daily basis (weekdays only). If an 
event was reported simultaneously by more than one 
source, and if there was conflicting information, WHO 
reports were ranked highest, followed by ECDC and 
ProMED. If an event was reported prior to a WHO report 
by another source, both the WHO and the initial report 
were recorded.
Line list
The line list covered demographic case information, 
namely the country to which the cases were assigned 
to in the initial reports, the patients’ age (in years) and 
sex, date of symptom onset, date of hospitalisation, 
disease outcome, date of death, exposure to poten-
tially infected poultry, as well as possible contact with 
infected individuals. Time intervals from symptom 
onset to hospitalisation, from hospital admission to 
outcome, the duration of hospitalisation, and the dura-
tion of illness were captured in days. The line list and 
a description of the variable set are provided online 
(http://www.rki.de/avian-influenza-linelist).
Case definitions
Cases were classified into three groups: confirmed 
cases, non-confirmed probable, and suspected cases, 
in a more simplified way than by WHO. Confirmed 
cases comprised avian influenza A(H5N1) human cases 
reported by WHO and with WHO confirmation, i.e. per-
sons with defined clinical signs, epidemiological links 
and laboratory confirmation by an influenza laboratory 
accepted by WHO, as specified in the WHO case defini-
tion [28].
Other reported cases were (irrespective of their clini-
cal presentation) considered as probable if they had 
exposure to WHO confirmed human cases, or to sick or 
dead poultry, or the AI virus infection was confirmed by 
the country or local institutions but not meeting WHO 
criteria. All other non-confirmed cases were defined as 
suspected cases.
Data analyses
The line list records were compared to the cumulative 
number of confirmed human cases of avian influenza 
A(H5N1) published by WHO [12]. The delay (in days) 
between the date of WHO reporting, and the date of 
the first report by another source than WHO, was cal-
culated for WHO confirmed cases. 
Confirmed cases were further analysed for demo-
graphic and epidemiological characteristics strati-
fied by countries, including China, Egypt, Indonesia 
and Vietnam (with 10 or more cases) and a remaining 
group of all other countries. The cases were classified 
in age groups of 10 year intervals. Incidences were 
calculated over the study period as cases per 10 mil-
lion population, using population data from the United 
Nations [29]. Median and inter-quartile ranges (IQRs) 
were calculated for continuous variables and absolute 
numbers and proportions (together with 95% exact 
confidence intervals (CIs)) for categorical variables. For 
comparison of characteristics, the Kruskal-Wallis test, 
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and Fisher’s Exact 
test were used. Case fatality was assessed by calcu-
lating the cumulative (cCFR) and a rolling case fatality 
rate (rCFR). Investigated factors potentially associated 
with case fatality were age (grouped as 0–9, 10–19, 
20–29, ≥30 years), sex, country, time from symptom 
onset to hospitalisation, and reported exposure to 
poultry. Univariable and multivariable logistic regres-
sion had been performed and results were presented 
as odds ratios (OR) with 95% confidence intervals. In 
multivariable analysis forward and backward selec-
tion was applied on all variables, where sex was taken 
into account in all calculations. All possible two-way 
interaction terms were tested separately and the likeli-
hood ratio test was used to analyse whether interac-
tion terms improved the model at a significance level 
of 10%. The reported p values are two sided and p<0.05 
was considered statistically significant. Data were ana-
lysed using Excel (version 11, Microsoft Corporation, 
Redmond, Washington, USA) and Stata (version 11.0, 




In the study period, we captured 294 human AI cases 
in 12 different countries of which 235 (80%) were WHO 
confirmed, 35 (12%) were classified as probable, and 
24 (8%) as suspected. The proportion of confirmed 
cases was highest in Egypt (98/99, 99%) and lowest 
in Indonesia (82/126, 65%). Numbers of reported WHO 
confirmed cases in our line list were largely congru-
ent with cumulative case numbers published by WHO, 
except for Indonesia with 82 versus 102 cases, respec-
tively (Table 1). This allowed for a close reproduction of 
WHO graphs on avian influenza A(H5N1) human cases 
by date of symptom onset and country, which reveal 
highest case numbers in the winter and spring season 
of the northern hemisphere (Figure 1).
The median delay from symptom onset to the initial 
report by any source was 11 days among 201 cases with 
available information (Table 1). Egypt had the shortest 
median delay of seven days. Fifty-two percent of the 
confirmed cases (123/235) were initially reported by 
another source than WHO in a median of three days 
prior to the WHO report (Table 1). The shortest median 
delay between the initial report and the WHO report 
was two days in China and Indonesia, whereas the 
longest median delay was nine days in Vietnam and 
the grouped remaining countries.
Demographic characteristics
Fifty-seven percent of confirmed cases (132/233 with 
available information) were women and 43% (101/233) 
men corresponding to a men-to-women ratio of 0.8. 
This ratio ranged from 0.6 to 1.3, with 0.6 in Indonesia, 
0.8 in Egypt, 1.0 in the grouped remaining countries, 
1.1 in Vietnam, and 1.3 in China.
The cases’ median age was 18 years but was signifi-
cantly higher in women than in men (21 years in women 
vs 14 years in men, p=0.04, Table 2). The median age 
differed markedly across countries. The lowest median 
age of six years was found in Egypt with significant 
difference between women and men (16.5 vs 4 years, 
respectively, p=0.002). In Egypt, the youngest age 
group (0 to 9 years) accounted for the highest number 
of cases with 53 of 98 cases (54%) and had the high-
est incidence of 284 cases per 10 million population of 
the same age group, over the four-year study period. 
In contrast, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam had highest 
case numbers and incidences in the age group of 20 to 
29 years (Figure 2).
Exposure to poultry
Ninety-six percent of confirmed cases (187/194 with 
available information) had reportedly direct or indirect 
contact to potentially infected poultry. The proportion 
of individuals with reported exposure differed signifi-
cantly across countries (p=0.009) and ranged from 
80% to 100%, with 8/10 in the grouped remaining 
countries, 10/12 in China, 55/57 in Indonesia, 93/94 in 
Egypt and 21/21 in Vietnam without significant differ-
ences by the cases’ sex or age (p=0.70 and p=0.06, 
respectively).
Table 1
Status and cumulative number of avian influenza human cases reported by the World Health Organization and captured by 
the Robert Koch Institute monitoring system, and delay in reporting confirmed cases, September 2006–August 2010
IQR: inter-quartile range.
RKI: Robert Koch Institute.
WHO: World Health Organization.
a reported as cumulative numbers by the WHO [2].
b only WHO confirmed cases, the initial report is by any source. 
c data only available for cases reported initially by a different source than the WHO. 
d Number of cases with available information.
e Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic Korea, Thailand.
f Bangladesh (N=1), Cambodia (N=4), Laos (N=2), Myanmar (N=1), Nigeria (N=1), Pakistan (N=3).





Number and percentage of cases and their confirmation status 
(RKI line list)
Delay from symptom 
onset to initial reportb 
Delay from initial 
report to WHO reportb,c
Nd
Total Confirmed Probable Suspected in days in days
Nd % Nd % Nd % Nd % Nd median (IQR) Nd median (IQR)
China 18 19 100 18 95 0 0 1 5 18 11.5 (9–14) 10 2 (1–3)
Egypt 98 99 100 98 99 0 0 1 1 77 7 (5–13) 43 3 (1–5)
Indonesia 102 126 100 82 65 27 21 17 13 71 12 (10–18) 48 2 (1–4)
Vietnam 26 34 100 25 74 4 12 5 15 25 13 (11–20) 18 9 (4–20)
all otherse 12 16 100 12f 75 4g 25 0 0 10 20 (7–116) 4 9 (5–12)
all countries 256 294 100 235 80 35 12 24 8 201 11 (7–16) 123 3 (1–6)
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Figure 1
Number of confirmed avian influenza A(H5N1) human cases by date of symptom onset and country, as well as cumulative 
case fatality rate and 19-months rolling case fatality rates, September 2006–August 2010 (n=213)
cCFR: cumulative case fatality rate.
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All 228 cases with available information had been 
hospitalised. Patients were admitted to hospital in a 
median of four days after symptom onset (N=197, Table 
3). The median time from symptom onset to hospitali-
sation ranged from two to five days, with two days in 
Egypt, two and a half days in the grouped remaining 
countries, four days in China and five days in Indonesia 
and Vietnam. No significant sex-specific differences 
were found in this delay (p=0.706).
Case fatality
Fifty-six percent (132/235) of confirmed cases died. The 
CFR differed across countries ranging from 28% (27/98) 
in Egypt to 87% (71/82) in Indonesia. The cCFR and the 
19-month rCFR indicated a decline in case fatality over 
the study period (Figure 1). Whereas the cCFR was lit-
tle affected by the outcome of new cases and had only 
slightly decreased, the rCFR had steeply declined in the 
period from April 2008 to April 2009. Until mid 2008, a 
large proportion of cases occurred in Indonesia (coun-
try with highest CFR) and shifted thereafter to Egypt 
(country with lowest CFR). Accordingly, country-specific 
rCFRs for Indonesia and Egypt were less steep than the 
overall rCFR. The 19-months rCFR was privileged as it 
was less affected by case-free periods than rCFRs cal-
culated over shorter periods (not shown).
In Egypt, fatal cases had a median age of 25 years, which 
was, at significant level, higher than the age of cases 
who survived (four years, p<0.001; Table 2). The CFR in 
Egypt was significantly higher in women than in men, 
(39% (22/56) vs 12% (5/42) respectively, p=0.003), 
which was not observed elsewhere (China: 63% (5/8) 
in women vs 70% (7/10) in men, p=1.0; Indonesia: 84% 
(43/51) vs 90% (28/31), p=0.521; Vietnam: 58% (7/12) 
vs 69% (9/13), p=0.688; remaining countries: 80% 
(4/5) vs 40% (2/5), p=0.524, respectively).
A significant difference in time from symptom onset to 
hospitalisation between survivors and fatal cases was 
only found in Egypt (one day vs four and a half days 
respectively, p=0.001, Table 3). All 19 cases worldwide 
hospitalised eight days after symptom onset or later 
had died.
Figure 3 shows the CFR in function of the time from 
symptom onset to hospitalisation, stratified by Egypt 
and Asian countries (grouped).
 
The median time from symptom onset to death was 
nine days (N=118), irrespective of the patients’ sex 
(p=0.605), and without significant difference across 
age groups (p=0.564, data not shown) or reporting 
countries (p=0.213).
The multivariable logistic regression revealed that 
odds of fatal outcome increased by 33% with each day 
that passed from symptom onset until hospitalisation 
(OR: 1.33, 95% CI: 1.11–1.60, p=0.002). In relation to 
children of 0–9 years, odds of fatal outcome were more 
than six times higher in 10–19 year-olds and 20–29 
year-olds (OR: 6.06, 95% CI: 1.89–19.48, p=0.002 and 
OR: 6.16, 95% CI: 2.05–18.53, p=0.001, respectively), 
and nearly five times higher in patients of 30 years and 
older (OR: 4.71, 95% CI: 1.56–14.27, p=0.006). Using 
Indonesia as a reference, odds of dying were lower 
elsewhere, namely by 92% in Egypt (OR: 0.08, 95% 
CI: 0.03–0.22, p<0.001), by 81% in China (OR: 0.19, 
95% CI: 0.04–0.90, p=0.036), and by 79% in Vietnam 
(OR: 0.21, 95% CI: 0.06–0.75, p=0.016), but not in 
the grouped remaining countries (OR: 0.23, 95% CI: 
0.04–1.27, p=0.091). Exposure to poultry was not sig-
nificant and none of the interaction terms significantly 
improved the model fit. They were thus not retained in 
the final model.
Discussion and conclusions
With this study, we summarised the current global AI 
situation in humans. It is, to our knowledge, the first 
study that not only analysed human AI cases worldwide 
on the basis of a line list collected over several years 
but in addition made these case-based data available 
online. We found that a longer delay from symptom 
onset to hospital admission and belonging to older 
age groups were associated with higher mortality in AI 
patients, and that the situation in Egypt differed mark-
edly from other countries with highest AI incidences in 
children and lowest CFR.
With our line list, cumulative case numbers published 
by WHO [4] could be largely reproduced: 235 of 256 
WHO confirmed cases (92%) and additional 59 uncon-
firmed cases were captured between September 2006 
and August 2010. The identified median reporting 
Figure 3
Time from confirmed avian influenza A(H5N1) human 
cases’ symptom onset to hospitalisation and case fatality 
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delay of 11 days after symptom onset may partly be 
explained by a deferred presentation to healthcare 
facilities as well as by the time needed for pathogen 
confirmation. About 52% of confirmed cases had been 
reported elsewhere in a median of three days prior to 
the WHO report. Because delays in availability of infor-
mation could hamper investigations of the source of 
infection and of clusters of human cases [30], it could 
be beneficial to report and document probable cases in 
parallel with confirmed ones [31].
Confirmed cases had a median age of 18 years, which is 
consistent with earlier findings, although investigation 
periods and affected countries varied [2,19,21]. The 
identified predominance of female cases in Indonesia 
and Egypt and the low age median among Egyptian 
cases support findings from previous studies [2,23-
25]. Schroedl [32] examined the mean age of cases in 
Egypt over four seasons between August 2006 and July 
2009 and found a declining age-based pattern over 
time, but did not address sex-specific differences. We 
found, in line with other studies, a significantly older 
age of female cases than male cases, whose propor-
tion had increased since 2008 in Egypt [24,25]. Chen 
et al., analysing AI cases worldwide before June 2006, 
also identified sex-specific differences in the age-
groups of 4 to 6 years (95% male) and 25 to 30 years 
(83% female) [33]. They assumed particularly high lev-
els of exposure in pre-school boys playing outdoors 
and housewives taking care of fowl and frequenting 
live markets. Fasina et al. suggested a similar explana-
tion for the situation in Egypt [25].
Ninety-six percent of the cases had reportedly direct 
or indirect contact to potentially infected poultry, rec-
ognised as the most important risk factor for humans 
AI [8,34]. The WHO Clinical Case summary Form [35], 
where e.g. “poultry” can be checked as “most likely 
source of infection” has enhanced the systematic col-
lection of information since 2007. However, currently 
reported information yields little insights into the 
actual source of infection and the intensity and quality 
of exposure needed to infect humans [36-38].
The median time from symptom onset to hospitalisation 
was four days, which is remarkably stable when com-
pared to earlier studies [19,21]. If time to hospital admis-
sion is regarded as an indicator for monitoring case 
management and patients’ awareness [31], no progress 
would be evident from a global perspective so far.
The cases’ average CFR was 56%, which is widely con-
sistent with findings from earlier investigation periods 
[2,19,23]. Using a 19-month rolling CFR, we found a 
clear decrease in case fatality, which persisted when 
stratifying for Egypt and Indonesia. It could thus not 
simply be explained by a predominance of Egyptian 
cases since 2009. Regarding the decreasing CFR in 
Egypt, Schroedl [32] suggested that the circulating AI 
virus strain may have become less virulent and more 
apt to spreading among children.
Analytical results revealed lowest odds of dying for 
Egyptian cases, even when adjusted for age, sex and 
time to hospitalisation. Thus, the high proportion of 
survivors in Egypt cannot be entirely explained – as 
often assumed – by sex-specific differences in CFR 
[21,24] and the high proportion of children among 
AI patients in Egypt [5], as well as short delays from 
symptom onset to hospitalisation [25].
It cannot be ruled out, that different virus clades circu-
lating in Egypt (clade 2.2) and Asia (clades 2.1 and 2.3) 
shape the country-specific epidemiological features 
[2,23]. Differences in CFR across countries and changes 
over time might also partly be explained by differences 
in intensity and quality of exposure, health-seeking 
behaviour, reporting attitudes, overall performance 
of the surveillance system, and access to diagnos-
tics and medical care [23,27,39,40], such as the time 
to start of oseltamivir treatment, the antiviral recom-
mend by WHO for human infections with AI virus [2]. 
However, country-specific details on its administration 
are widely unknown and it remains controversial up to 
how many days after symptom onset the application of 
the antiviral reduces mortality [30,41]. In our study all 
patients hospitalised eight or more days after symp-
tom onset died. This suggests a rather narrow time 
window for antiviral drug administration.
Our study was solely based on data from publicly 
available case reports and is subject to several limi-
tations. Our monitoring instrument was only entirely 
implemented in August 2006 and thus trend analyses 
were not exploited to its full extent. Within the used 
reports, negative values, e.g. “case not hospitalised”, 
were not systematically mentioned, which may lead to 
biases. Time specifications, e.g. on dates of exposure 
or hospitalisation, needed for time-to-event analyses, 
were often incomplete. Case reports did not systemati-
cally contain details on medical care and specific anti-
viral treatment. Therefore, analyses were restricted 
to “hospitalisation” as general indicator for access to 
medical care. Given the sparse information on possible 
contact with infected individuals and clusters of human 
AI cases available from the serial reports within the 
investigated period, clusters could not be evaluated as 
initially planned. Other studies reporting on clustered 
cases had mostly accessed additional case-investiga-
tion reports and patient interviews [23,30]. We based 
our analyses on WHO confirmed cases, although 
unconfirmed cases had been recorded in our line list, 
due to lacking information for probable and suspected 
cases. Including probable cases in our analyses did, 
however, not change the cases’ sex ratio or CFR sub-
stantially when compared to confirmed cases only.
Our study points out that data extracted from the pub-
lic domain already yields pertinent epidemiological 
information for assessing the current situation and 
developments of AI in humans. A line list format as 
provided would enhance the analysability of key data, 
their updating, and the evaluation of variables needed. 
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Several countries monitor the global AI situation, 
whether they currently face human AI cases, e.g. Egypt 
[25], or not, e.g. France [27]. This indicates a common 
interest in data and if they were directly provided in 
such format, this would help to save time and resources 
for public health authorities and researchers.
A line list needs to be flexible in view of potential new 
information to be entered. New variables and param-
eter values might come up, when the minimum dataset 
suggested Bird and Farrar [31] on direct and indirect 
exposures to avian influenza A(H5N1) confirmed and 
non-confirmed poultry and human exposures would 
be implemented or when results from prospective 
studies involving exposed and unexposed individu-
als as designed by Kayali et al. [34] are available. 
Unconfirmed cases would ideally be recorded as sys-
tematically as confirmed cases, either in a common or 
separate database as suggested by Bird and Farrar [31].
Presenting cases in the format of a line list is not a 
goal in itself, but a prerequisite for targeting surveil-
lance and identifying risk factors, as well as a starting 
point for prospective studies, e.g. investigating poten-
tial human-to-human transmission, the transmissibil-
ity of avian influenza viruses, and host-related factors 
including age-dependent immunity in humans [33,42].
We would like to encourage that an anonymised case-
based database for AI in humans is directly placed 
publicly and continuously updated, e.g. by an inter-
nationally renowned organisation such as WHO. Open 
access to analysable data might accelerate the identi-
fication and implementation of research questions and 
surveillance priorities and thus enhance our under-
standing of – still mostly fatal – AI in humans and 
permit the rapid detection of epidemiological changes 
with implications for human health.
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